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Compassion in Dying v. Washington: A
Resolution to the "Jurisprudenceof Doubt"
Enshrouding Physician-Assisted Suicide?
By affirming a district court decision 1 holding Washington's criminal
prohibition of assisted suicide2 unconstitutional, an en banc Ninth
Circuit in Compassion in Dying v. Washington3 reversed a three judge
panel decision 4 and proffered the most reasoned and carefully drafted
opinion yet in the battle surrounding terminally ill patients and their
quest to legally pursue physician-assisted suicide. Three terminally ill
patients, five physicians who treat terminally ill patients,5 and

1. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (granting
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment), affd en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
2. Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060(1) (2) (1995). The statute reads as follows: "(1) A
person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another
person to attempt suicide. (2) Promoting a suicide attempt is a Class C felony." Id.
Washington voters rejected a voter referendum that would have legalized physicianassisted suicide for the terminally ill by a narrow margin in 1991. Victoria Slind-Flor,
Sides Turn Up Heat on Assisted Suicide, 18 NATL L.J. 11 (1995), at A12 [hereinafter SlindFlor]. Compassion in Dying, which had backed the referendum, subsequently filed suit.
Id. The plaintiffs only challenged the "or aids" portion of the statute. Compassion in
Dying, 79 F.3d at 797.
3. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The decision also indicated its disagreement
with Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995).
4. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd en banc, 79
F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
5. The five physician plaintiffs are Dr. Harold Glucksberg, an assistant professor of
medicine at the University of Washington School of Medicine who practices oncology (the
treatment of cancer) at the Pacific Medical Center in Seattle; Dr. John P. Geyman, a
professor emeritus at the University of Washington and past chair of the Department of
Family Medicine at the University of Washington School of Medicine who also has a
private practice in family medicine; Dr. Thomas A. Preston, chief of the cardiology unit at
Pacific Medical Center in Seattle; Dr. Abigail Halpern, a family medicine practitioner who
occasionally treats patients with terminal illnesses including cancer and AIDS; and Dr.
Peter Shalit, who practices general internal medicine and has a substantial number of
patients infected with HIV or suffering from AIDS. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at
1457-58. All five "state that they have received requests from terminally ill, mentally
competent patients in the final stage of their diseases who wished assistance in hastening
death," but have not done so because of the Washington statute. Id. at 1458.
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Compassion in Dying,' an organization that provides counseling and
assistance to mentally competent, terminally ill adults considering

suicide, challenged the statute under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. " Asserting that
mentally competent, terminally ill adults have a right to voluntarily
hasten their death by taking a lethal dose of physician prescribed drugs,
they sought both declaratory and injunctive relief' All three patients
were suffering from the terminal phases of their respective illnesses and
used pseudonyms to protect their privacy. They were Jane Roe, a sixtynine-year-old retired pediatrician suffering from breast cancer, which
had spread throughout her skeleton; John Doe, a forty-four-year-old
artist suffering from AIDS, who had lost seventy percent of his vision
due to a degenerative eye disease that would eventually cause total
blindness; and James Poe, a sixty-nine-year-old retired sales representative suffering from emphysema, a condition which caused a constant
suffocating sensation, requiring him to use an oxygen tank at all times
and take morphine regularly to ease the panic associated with his feeling
of suffocation.9 Jane Roe and John Doe both died before the district
court rendered its judgment, and James Poe died soon thereafter."0
The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
declared the statute unconstitutional under both a Due Process and

6. Compassion in Dying is a non-profit organization that "provides information,
counseling and assistance free of charge to mentally competent, terminally ill adult
patients considering suicide and to the families of such patients." Id.
According to its guidelines, Compassion in Dying will not assist anyone to commit
suicide who expresses any ambivalence or uncertainty. If the patient has
immediate family members or other close personal friends, their approval must
be obtained. If any members of the immediate family express disapproval,
Compassion in Dying will not provide assistance with suicide. As an additional
safeguard, Compassion in Dying requires the patient to provide medical records.
A consulting physician must review them to verify the patient's terminal prognosis
and decision-making capability as well as to rule out inadequate pain management as the reason for requesting assisted suicide.
Id. at 1458.
7. Id. at 1459. The district court did not rule on the claims of the four physicians or
Compassion in Dying because they were not adequately addressed in the motions for
summary judgment submitted to the court. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 589.
8. 850 F. Supp. at 1456. The physicians were granted standing to assert the rights
of their terminally ill patients in general. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 795 (noting
that the district court properly granted the physicians standing to assert the rights of their
patients). Although Compassion in Dying was listed as the primary plaintiff in the case
heading, their claims were not before the district court or subsequently the Ninth Circuit.
Id. at 797. The district court stated that it would reach Compassion in Dying's claims later
in the proceedings if necessary. Id.
9. Id. at 1456-57.
10. 49 F.3d at 588.
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Equal Protection analysis, but declined to enjoin its enforcement.1 In
a decision blatantly driven by the religious and personal biases of the
majority, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding no
constitutional support for the right of mentally competent, terminally ill
adults to voluntarily hasten death with a lethal dose of physician

11. 850 F. Supp. at 1467-68. Relying on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992), Chief Judge Deborah Rothstein held that like abortion, "the decision of a terminally
ill person to end his or her life 'involv[es] the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime' and constitutes a 'choice[ central to personal dignity and
autonomy'" and was therefore a fundamental right. Id. at 1460 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S.
at 851). She also found Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990),
"instructive" in determining that mentally competent, terminally ill patients had a
fundamental right to assisted suicide, stating that "the court does not believe that a
distinction can be drawn between refusing life-sustaining medical treatment and physicianassisted suicide by an uncoerced, mentally competent, terminally ill adult." Id. at 1461.
Applying the Casey "undue burden" test, Judge Rothstein held that the statute not only
presents a substantial obstacle for terminally ill, mentally competent persons wishing to
commit suicide, but entirely prohibits the exercise of this constitutional right. Id. at 1465
(citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 878, which states that a government regulation is an "undue
burden" on a fundamental right if in a large fraction of cases it would operate as a
substantial obstacle to the exercise of the right). Judge Rothstein also examined the two
primary interests furthered by the statute, "preventing suicide and protecting those at risk
of suicide from undue influence from others who would aid them in completing the act."
Id. at 1464. However, she concluded that "the State's legitimate interest in preventing
suicide is not abrogated by allowing mentally competent, terminally ill patients" for whom
suicide would not abruptly cut life short "to freely and voluntarily commit physicianassisted suicide." Id. Addressing the state's concern for those who may commit suicide
from undue influence or duress, she held that those "who make knowing and voluntary
choices to commit physician-assisted suicide by definition fall outside the realm of the
State's concern." Id. at 1465. Because mentally competent, terminally ill adults may
lawfully hasten death under Washington's Natural Death Act by ending life-sustaining
treatment, Judge Rothstein also held the statute to violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 1466-67. Washington's Natural Death Act reads in relevant part:
The legislature finds that adult persons have the fundamental right to control
the decisions relating to the rendering of their own health care, including the
decision to have life-sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn in instances of
a terminal condition or permanent unconscious condition.
The legislature further finds that modem medical technology has made possible
the artificial prolongation of human life beyond natural limits.
The legislature further finds that, in the interest of protecting individual
autonomy, such prolongation of the process of dying for persons with a terminal
condition or permanent unconscious condition may cause loss of patient dignity,
and unnecessary pain and suffering, while providing nothing medically necessary
or beneficial to the patient.
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.010 (1995).
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prescribed drugs. 2 On March 16, 1996, the Ninth Circuit en banc
reversed the panel and upheld the district court. 3
There are three sources of substantive liberty rights under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the most familiar being
those enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 4 Liberty has also been held to
encompass rights rooted in our nation's tradition, or those practices
protected from government intrusion by law when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified. 5 Finally, and most importantly for the
assisted suicide debate, liberty has also been held to include "a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter," 6 rights
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."7 The Supreme Court has
12. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 594. Both Judge Noonan and Judge O'Scannlain,
who joined Judge Noonan's majority opinion, have strong Catholic affiliations and ties to
Catholic organizations with open pro-life opinions. Howard Mintz, Ninth Circuit Judges
Spar Over "Right to Die," THE RECORDER, October 27, 1995 [hereinafter Mintz].
Compassion in Dying had asked Noonan to withdraw from the case, but the request was
never acted upon. Id.
The tone of Noonan's majority opinion and choice of words in several contexts belies any
notion ofjudicial impartiality. Judge Noonan first admonished the district court for using
language from Casey out of context to support the right of mentally competent, terminally
ill persons to have assistance in hastening their deaths, calling it "an enormous leap" that
does "violence to the context" and "ignore[s] the differences between the regulation of
reproduction and the prevention of the promotion of killing a patient at his or her request."
49 F.3d at 590. Unable to limit his analysis to the rights of mentally competent, terminally
ill adults, Noonan stated that "[i]f at the heart of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment is this uncurtailable ability to believe and to act on one's deepest beliefs about
life, the right to suicide and the right to assistance in suicide are the prerogative of...
every sane adult." Id. at 591. Second, Noonan accused the district court of ignoring
Cruzan's recognition of the state's interest in preserving life, and faulted its interpretation
of "Cruzan'slimited acknowledgement of a right to refuse treatment as tantamount to an
acceptance of a terminally ill patient's right to aid in self-killing." Id. Finally, Noonan
held that Washington's interests "outweigh any alleged liberty of suicide." Id. Those
interests included not having physicians kill their patients, not pressuring the elderly and
infirm to consent to their own deaths, protecting the poor and minorities from exploitation
and protecting the handicapped from societal indifference. Id. at 592. Following his
assertion that "justice, prudence, and fortitude" are more important components ofjudicial
character than compassion, and noting that the law has "never recognized a right to let
others enslave you, mutilate you, or kill you," the court upheld the validity of the statute.
Id. at 594. Judge Wright dissented. Id.
13. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 838-39.
14. 505 U.S. at 847. Although an argument may be made under a generalized
Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy, the Supreme Court has stated that the right to
refuse treatment is more properly analyzed as a liberty interest. 497 U.S. at 279 n.7.
Therefore, as most plaintiffs have argued, the right to assisted suicide is likely a
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.
15. 505 U.S. at 847.
16. Id.
17. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
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held this animate definition of liberty to encompass marriage, procreation and abortion, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education."8 Those seeking to reject the right to physician-assisted
suicide argue that no constitutional right can exist because it was not a
practice protected by law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.
On the contrary, it has traditionally been proscribed by law. 9 Those
trying to establish the right commonly assert the more lithe and
dynamic "realm of personal liberty" as the source for a right to assisted
suicide, analogizing to the Supreme Court's rulings in Cruzan v.
Director,Missouri Department of Health'° and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey."'
In Cruzan, the Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether
Due Process Clause liberty includes a "right to die."22 Nancy Beth
Cruzan suffered severe head injuries in an automobile accident, causing
a persistent vegetative state with no significant cognitive function.
Nancy's parents sought to terminate artificial nutrition and hydration
when it became apparent she had virtually no chance of regaining her
mental faculties. When hospital employees refused to grant their
request, Nancy's parents filed suit, asserting a fundamental right under
the Fourteenth Amendment to terminate "death prolonging procedures."" Although granted by the trial court, the Supreme Court of
Missouri denied the request because Nancy's parents could not show
"clear and convincing evidence" of her desire to terminate life support
under such circumstances.24 The court also doubted whether a right to

18. 505 U.S. at 851-52.
19. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795
(1995); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996). However, courts frequently disagree on
the issue. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 809 ("[bly the time the Fourteenth Amendment
was adopted in 1868, suicide was generally not punishable, and in only nine of the 37
states is it clear that there were statutes prohibiting assisting suicide").
20. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).

21. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
22. 497 U.S. at 277. "This is the first case in which we have been squarely presented
with the issue whether the United States Constitution grants what is in common parlance

referred to as a 'right to die.'" Id.
23. Id. at 266-68. Nancy's parents also brought an Equal Protection challenge, claiming

that Missouri impermissibly treats incompetent patients differently from competent ones.
Id. ,at 287 n.12. The Missouri Supreme Court rejected the argument, stating that the
differences between the choice of a competent person to refuse treatment and the choice

made for an incompetent person by someone else are so obviously different that the State
is warranted in establishing a more rigorous evidentiary standard. Id. at 287.
24. Id. at 268-69. Nancy's guardian ad litem, who did not disagree with the trial
court's decision, brought the appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court because he felt he had
a duty to do so. Id. at 334.
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refuse medical treatment existed under the Constitution, placing the
right to refuse treatment in the doctrine of informed consent.25 The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court's
"clear and convincing" standard, 5 limiting its analysis to whether
Missouri could impose the evidentiary burden on those seeking to
terminate an incompetent person's life-sustaining hydration and
nutrition.2 ' However, in order to facilitate that analysis, the Court
assumed that Fourteenth Amendment liberty would grant the right to
a competent person.2' This assumption has provided a foundation for
25. Id. at 268.
Informed consent is the name for a general principle of law that a physician has
a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community
in the exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his patient as to whatever
grave risks of injury might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so
that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and faced with a
choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at
all, may intelligently exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the probable
risks against the probable benefits.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 779 (6th ed. 1990).
26. 497 U.S. at 265. The question before the Court was whether Nancy Cruzan had a
right under the United States Constitution which would require the hospital to withdraw
life sustaining treatment from her under the circumstances presented. Id. at 268. The
Court also rejected petitioner's alternative contention that Missouri "must accept the
substituted judgment of close family members even in the absence of substantial proof that
their views reflect the views of the patient." Id. at 285-86.
27. Id. at 279-80.
28. Id. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion, agreeing that "a protected liberty
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions
... and that the refusal of artificially delivered food and water is encompassed within that
liberty interest." Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor went on to say
that "[a] seriously ill or dying patient whose wishes are not honored may feel a captive of
the machinery required for life-sustaining measures or other medical interventions." Id.
at 288.
Requiring a competent adult to endure such procedures against her will burdens
the patient's liberty, dignity, and freedom to determine the course of her own
treatment. Accordingly, the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must
protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to reject
medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water.
Id. at 289. Justice Scalia also filed a concurring opinion, stating that:
(w]hile I agree with the Court's analysis today,... I would have preferred that we
announce, clearly and promptly, that the federal courts have no business in this
field; that American law has always accorded the state the power to prevent, by
force if necessary, suicide-including suicide by refusing to take appropriate
measures necessary to preserve one's [own] life; that the point at which life
becomes "worthless," and the point at which the means necessary to preserve it
become "extraordinary" or "inappropriate," are neither set forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine Justices of this Court any better than they are known
to nine people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone directory ... and
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plaintiffs asserting the right to physician-assisted suicide, who argue
that because both result in the patient's death, they are fundamentally
identical. Those opposed to the right counter that it causes death by
affirmative action while the termination of life support simply lets
nature take its course. Ammunition for both sides of the assisted suicide

debate can be found in the Court's justification of both the assumption
and Missouri's evidentiary burden for incompetent persons. The Court
recognized not only that "[t]he choice between life and death is a deeply
personal decision of obvious and overwhelming finality," but also that
the state may "assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of
human life," finding no dispute "that the Due Process Clause protects an
interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining medical
treatment." 29 Also recognizing Missouri's right to protect against the
possibility of abuse when surrogates assert an incompetent patient's
right to refuse treatment, the Court balanced the liberty interests
assumed against the state interest"0 and held that the "clear and

...it is up to the citizens of Missouri to decide, through their elected representatives, whether that wish will be honored.
Id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring). Finding no historical basis for a right to commit suicide,
he would have declined to extend substantive due process to protect the right assumed by
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion. Id. Justice Brennan, with whom Justices
Marshall and Blackmun joined dissenting, would have affirmatively recognized Nancy
Cruzan's "fundamental right to be free of unwanted artificial nutrition and hydration." Id.
at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Stating that "Nancy Cruzan is entitled to choose to die
with dignity," they would not have qualified the right with any state interest, and found
that the Missouri Supreme Court's clear and convincing procedural obstacle impermissibly
burdened that right. Id. "For many, the thought of an ignoble end, steeped in decay, is
abhorrent. A quiet, proud death, bodily integrity intact, is a matter of extreme
consequence." Id. at 310-11. Most importantly, they recognized that the state's interest
in life cannot be abstracted from the interest of the person living that life, and would not
allow Missouri's general interest in life to outweigh Nancy Cruzan's particular and intense
interest in self determination. Id. at 314. Although not denying that procedural
safeguards are necessary to protect the state's interests, the Justices believed that
Missouri's rule "imposes a markedly asymmetrical evidentiary burden." Id. at 315-16.
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, agreed that "a competent individual's decision to
refuse life-sustaining medical procedures is an aspect of liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause." Id. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also agreed that
procedural safeguards were required, but that the appointment of the guardian ad litem
coupled with the trial court's searching inquiry under the clear and convincing standard
was adequate. Id. at 353.
29. Id. at 281.
30. Id. "'[WIhether respondent's constitutional rights have been violated must be
determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests.'" Id. at
279 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)).
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convincing" standard adequately protected the rights of the state and the
patient. 1
Casey is also frequently cited by those seeking Constitutional
justification for a right to physician-assisted suicide. In Casey, five
abortion clinics, one physician individually, and a class of physicians
who provide abortion services challenged the constitutionality of five
provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982.32 During
the course of its opinion, the Court reaffirmed the fundamental holding
of Roe v. Wade"3 and the use of substantive due process to protect
fundamental liberty rights.3 4 Stating that matters "involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment," the Court defined the "heart
of liberty" as the "right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."38 Those
in favor of physician-assisted suicide have declared this language to be
prescriptive of the substantive liberty right they seek to assert. They
argue that like abortion, physician-assisted suicide is a choice central to
personal autonomy., Those on the other side of the issue contend that
the two rights are fundamentally different, and that the language cited

31. Id. at 262.
Here, Missouri has in effect recognized that under certain circumstances a
surrogate may act for the patient in electing to have hydration and nutrition
withdrawn in such a way as to cause death, but it has established a procedural
safeguard to assure that the action of the surrogate conforms as best it may to the
wishes expressed by the patient while competent.
Id. at 279. Evidence was presented that Nancy had expressed thoughts to a housemate
in a somewhat serious conversation that she would not want to continue her life unless she
could do so halfway normally. Id. at 268. The Missouri Supreme Court found the
statements "unreliable for the purpose of determining her intent" and "insufficient to
support the co-guardians ['] claim to exercise substituted judgment on Nancy's behalf." Id.
(quoting Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 426 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), affd, Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)). The Court stated that the
evidentiary burden properly placed the increased risk of erroneous decision on those
seeking to invoke an incompetent individual's right to terminate life-sustaining treatment.
Id. at 283.
32. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 841 (1992). Specifically, the provisions
requiring a minor to obtain the informed consent of a parent; the provision requiring all
women be provided with certain information 24 hours before the abortion is performed to
facilitate informed consent; the provision requiring married women to notify their
husbands; and the provisions imposing reporting requirements on facilities providing
abortions. Id. The Court upheld all but the spousal notification provision. Id. at 879.
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. 505 U.S. at 851-53.
35. Id. at 851.
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from Casey is merely dicta that was not intended to apply to assisted
suicide.
To date, the battles have been won by the anti-assisted suicide
movement because no decision recognizing a right to assisted suicide has
survived the appellate process.3" On December 13, 1994, the Mich-

36. The Michigan Circuit Court for Wayne County, Michigan was the first to consider
the issue in two separate challenges to the constitutionality of Michigan's statute
criminalizing assisted suicide. In Hobbins v. Attorney General, 1993 WL 276833 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. May 20, 1993), rev'd, Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App.
1994), rev'd, People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1795 (1995), two patients suffering from terminal cancer, a friend of one of the patients,
and seven health care professionals sought an injunction and declaration that Michigan's
assisted suicide statute was an unconstitutional invasion of privacy or liberty interests
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Citing to Cruzan,
the court held that the right of self-determination rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment
includes the right to choose to cease living, but declined to decide whether the Michigan
statute placed an unconstitutional burden on that right until a full record had been
developed on the issue. 1993 WL 276833 at *7, *9. In People v. Kevorkian, 1993 WL
603212 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1993), rev'd, Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487
(Mich. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995), the notorious physician, Jack Kevorkian, moved to dismiss
charges that he violated the same Michigan statute, 'claiming it infringed upon
fundamental liberty interests protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, Kevorkian
claimed the statute was an undue burden on a person's right to terminate their life when
terminally ill and suffering from intolerable pain. 1993 WL 603212 at *5. The court
rejected both the prosecutor's argument that the asserted right was not fundamental
because it had no basis in our Nation's history and tradition, and Kevorkian's argument
that history and tradition can be ignored when determining if a right is fundamental. Id.
at *7-*8. The court found an approach combining both tests more appropriate. Id. at *8.
Although recognizing that the view proscribing suicide currently predominates, the court
found evidence approving suicide in our traditions and history, and turned to the question
of whether suicide could ever be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Id. at *13. The
court held that the decision to hasten death was a right implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, finding that "there can be little doubt that the decision to commit suicide involves
an intimate and personal choice... [that] ranks among the most important that a person
may make concerning one's own being .... The choice between life and death is a deeply
personal decision of obvious and overwhelming finality.'" Id. at *14 (quoting Cruzan, 497
U.S. at 281). To determine the extent of this right, the court used the balancing test
enunciated in Cruzan and weighed the right against the state's unqualified interest in
preserving life. Id. at *14-15. Although the court found the state's interest compelling
enough to negate a right in many cases, the court held that "when a person's quality of life
is significantly impaired by a medical condition.., extremely unlikely to improve,... and
...

suicide is a reasonable response to the condition ... and the decision ...is freely made

without undue influence, such a person has a constitutionally protected right to commit
suicide." Id. at *19. Once the court defined the parameters of the right, it applied the
"undue burden" analysis from Casey and held the state's blanket proscription of suicide
unconstitutional. Id. at *19-20. The decisions in Hobbins and Kevorkian were appealed,
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igan Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Michigan's statute
prohibiting assisted-suicide against challenges by the notorious physician
Jack Kevorkian and other physicians, as well as several terminally ill
patients. 7 To decide whether the terminally ill have a right to assisted
suicide, the court held it must first determine whether there is a liberty
interest in suicide itself.8 The court refused to read Cruzan as
protecting a liberty interest more expansive than the right to refuse to
begin or continue life sustaining treatment, finding that Cruzan drew a
distinction between "acts that artificially sustain life and acts that
artificially curtail life."39 The court also limited Casey to liberty

the cases consolidated, and on May 10, 1994, a mere seven days after Judge Rothstein
declared Washington's statute unconstitutional, the court of appeals reversed. Hobbins v.
Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, People v. Kevorkian, 527
N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995). Asserting the state's
unqualified interest in protecting life, the court held that the "scope of rights encompassed
by the concept of ordered liberty does not include the right to commit suicide, much less
the right to assisted suicide." 518 N.W.2d at 492. The court also declined to extend the
right established in Cruzan to physician-assisted suicide, limiting that decision as only
recognizing the right "to refuse unwanted medical treatment and passively die a natural
death, not to actively intervene so as to hasten one's death." Id. at 493. On December 13,
1994, a majority of the Michigan Supreme Court reversed. People v. Kevorkian, 527
N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
37. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795
(1995). See infra note 39 and accompanying text. Justice Levin dissented in part, stating
that the act "violates the Due Process Clause insofar as it bars a competent, terminally ill
person facing imminent, agonizing death from obtaining medical assistance to commit
suicide." Id. at 746 (Levin, J., dissenting in part). Justice Levin also concluded that the
manner in which the majority phrased the question, "whether the [Due Process Cilause
encompasses a fundamental right to commit suicide and, if so, whether it includes a right
to assistance," foreordained the answer. Id. at 748. Following Cruzan, Justice Levin
concluded that "[wihether a competent, terminally ill person has a right to medical
assistance to commit suicide" can only be decided by "balancing the state's interest against
the person's interest." Id. at 749. Because the state interest in preserving life is weak
compared to the liberty interests of mentally competent, terminally ill persons facing
imminent, agonizing death, Justice Levin held the balance favors assisted suicide. Id. at
751. He then concluded that Michigan's total ban on assisted suicide violated Casey's
undue burden test. Id. Justice Mallett also dissented from the majority's conclusion that
there is never a right to hasten one's death. Id. (Mallett, J., dissenting). Agreeing with
the district court Compassion in Dying opinion, Justice Mallett criticized the majority's
strict adherence to history in declining to recognize a liberty interest, noting that "such a
test is unsuitable for the vast and fast-moving progressions of the modem world." Id. at
753. "The [F]ramers of the (C]onstitution ... understood that liberty could not be
summarized in a single document. .

... "

Id. at 756.

38. 527 N.W.2d at 726. The plaintiffs in Hobbins objected to the term "assisted
suicide," asserting only the right of mentally competent, terminally ill persons to hasten
inevitable death. Id. at 725 n.27.
39. Id. at 728.
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relationships, child rearing, and education,40 concluding that Casey did
not broaden the test for substantive due process rights, but still required
the court to determine whether the "right to commit suicide arises from
a rational evolution of tradition."4 ' After an examination of the history

of suicide in the United States, the court held that tradition provided no
support for assisted suicide. 42 Although the district court in Compas-

sion in Dying had declared Washington's assisted suicide statute
unconstitutional seven days earlier, the Michigan Supreme Court

declined to follow the rationale of that decision, stating that the district
court misapprehended the nature of the holdings in Cruzan and

Casey.4" On December 15, 1994, two days after the Michigan Supreme
Court rendered its decision and nine days after the Compassion in Dying
district court decision, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York was presented with a challenge to New York's
assisted suicide statutes in Quill v. Koppell." Three terminally ill
patients and three physicians filed suit seeking a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the statutes, asserting that they violated Due

Process and Equal Protection as applied to terminally ill, mentally
competent adults wishing to avoid continued severe suffering. 45 The

[Wihereas suicide involves an affirmative act to end a life, the refusal or cessation
of life-sustaining medical treatment simply permits life to run its course,
unencumbered by contrived intervention. Put another way, suicide frustrates the
natural course by introducing an outside agent to accelerate death, whereas the
refusal or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment allows nature to
proceed, i.e., death occurs because of the underlying condition.
Id. at 728.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 730.
42. Id. at 733. The court made a brief examination of the history of suicide in the
United States, concluding that "[it) would be an impermissibly radical departure from
existing tradition, and from the principles that underlie that tradition, to declare that there
is such a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause." Id.
43. Id. at 727-28. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. The court also noted that
an appeal of the decision was pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. Id. at 727 n.38.
44. 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd, Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
Section 125.15(3) of the New York Penal Law provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty
of manslaughter in the second degree when: ... (3) He intentionally ... aids another
person to commit suicide." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15(3) (McKinney 1987). Section 120.30
provides: "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he intentionally... aids
another person to attempt suicide." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 1987).
45. 870 F. Supp. at 79. The original complaint named three terminally ill patient
plaintiffs who wished to commit suicide with physician assistance, and three physician
plaintiffs. Id. All three of the patient plaintiffs have since died. Id.
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court disagreed.4" It rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide inevitably follows from Roe and
Casey's broad statements about fundamental liberty interests and
Cruzan'sassumption of a constitutional right to terminate life-sustaining
treatment, criticizing the plaintiffs' reading of those cases as "too
broad." Relying heavily on the "deeply rooted in our nation's history
and traditions" test," the same test used by the Michigan Supreme
Court to thwart the assertion of a constitutional right,4 9 the court found
no historic recognition of physician-assisted suicide as a legal right.,°
Neither did the court agree with the plaintiffs' argument that even if
there is no fundamental right to assisted suicide for the terminally ill,
criminalizing assisted suicide while allowing competent persons to refuse
medical treatment is discrimination that violates the Equal Protection
Clause.51 Because it did not implicate a fundamental right, the court
applied a low scrutiny test and held the statute bears a reasonable and
rational relation to the state's legitimate interest in preserving life.52
Three months later, on March 9, 1995, the Ninth Circuit panel reversed
the Compassion in Dying district court decision and held that Washington's assisted suicide statute was constitutional.5 3 A final twist was
added to the plot on August 3, 1995 by Lee v. Oregon, 4 a decision by
the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. Plaintiffs in
Lee challenged the constitutionality of Oregon's landmark Death With
Dignity Act ("the Act"), the first ballot initiative in the world to allow
"terminally ill adult[s] to obtain a doctor's prescription for a fatal drug
dosage for the express purpose of ending their life."5 Specifically,

46. Id. at 78.
47. Id. at 83.
48. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 730 (Mich. 1994). See supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
49. 527 N.W.2d at 730. Although the Michigan Supreme Court decided Hobbins two
days before Quill was decided, the court in Quill did not cite any of the Michigan cases.
However, it did note that the district court in Compassion in Dying reached a different
result, but that the decision was on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 870 F. Supp. at 85.
50. Id. at 83-84.
51. Id. at 84.
52. Id. "The issue is whether the distinction drawn by New York law has a reasonable
and rational basis." Id. (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-87 (1969)).
53. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586,588 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 79 F.3d
790 (9th Cir. 1996).
54. 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995), rev'd, Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d
790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
55. 891 F. Supp. at 1431. The Death With Dignity Act was approved by Oregon voters
in November 1994 by a margin of 51% to 49%. Nat Hentoff, Would HippocratesHave Done
It?, THE WASHINGTON POST, October 28, 1995, at A27. "Australia[']s Northern Territory
legalized euthanasia in May, but that law has not yet gone into effect. Euthanasia has
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plaintiffs claimed the statute violated Equal Protection because its
"classification or coverage to the 'terminally ill' is not rationally related
to a legitimate state interest."56 Chief Judge Hogan agreed, holding
that the Act did not contain sufficient safeguards for terminally ill
patients who may be mentally depressed, vulnerable, or incompetent, 7
thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause by not providing them the
same protections against suicide offered other citizens." Judge Hogan
concluded that it was rational for terminally ill persons to choose suicide
when the alternative "may simply mean prolonging suffering for a
person who has no hope of a significant natural life ahead,"59 but that
the statute suffered from several fatal infirmities. First, the procedures
designed to differentiate between competent and incompetent persons
were insufficient.e" For example, the statute does not mandate
evaluations from either psychiatrists or psychologists to determine if a
person is competents 1-the decision is left to the attending physician." Second, the statute does not properly define "terminally ill" or
"'terminal disease'. ... [Slince [sic] only in hindsight is it known with
certainty when someone is going to die."' Third, there are no provisions for an independent consulting physician to confirm that a person
is capable and acting voluntarily."r Fourth, for actions taken under the
Act, physicians are only held to a "subjective good faith" standard, not
the normal "objective reasonableness" standard of care.' Finally, there
is no requirement that the overdose be taken under the supervision of
a physician, creating a strong potential for abuse.' Therefore, not only
had every standing decision to date upheld the constitutionality of
criminal assisted suicide statutes, but even the first referendum in the
world granting the right had been struck down. The stage was now set
for the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision.

been tolerated in the Netherlands for years, but it is not technically legal there." Diane
M. Gianelli, Assisted suicide showdown headed to the high court?, AMERICAN MEDICAL
NEWS, August 21, 1995, at 38, n.31, p. 1(3).
56. 891 F. Supp. at 1431. Because plaintiffs only made a low scrutiny Equal Protection
challenge, the court did not decide whether a heightened or strict scrutiny test would apply
if a fundamental right was implicated. Id. at 1431 n.2.
57. Id. at 1438.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1434.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1435.
62. Id. at 1435 n.7.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1436.
66. Id.
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Unlike the panel decision before it, the en banc court gave thoughtful
and rational consideration to both sides of the issue before making its
decision, recognizing that "[pleople of good will can and do passionately
disagree about the proper result, perhaps even more intensely than they
part ways over ...

a woman's right to have an abortion."67 The court

phrased what it deemed "an extraordinarily important and difficult
issue" as "whether a person who is terminally ill has a constitutionallyprotected liberty interest in hastening what might otherwise be a
protracted, undignified, and extremely painful death.'6 First, under
the guidance of the "particular[ly] ... powerful precedent" of Casey, 9
the court held that terminally ill patients have a due process liberty
interest in choosing the time and manner of their death.70 Like a
woman's right to an abortion, "the decision of how and when to die is one
of 'the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime,' a choice 'central to personal dignity and autonomy.'" 71 The
court also held that because Cruzan found a liberty interest that
includes the right to refuse life-sustaining food and water, it "necessarily
recognizes a liberty interest in hastening one's own death."72 Unlike
courts that have refused to find such a liberty interest, the Ninth Circuit
en banc did not constrain itself to an analysis of historical traditions in
force at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, but applied
those traditions as well as the "fundamental tenets of our nation ... in
light of changing values based on shared experience" and the new
7
problems raised by "the development and use of new technologies." 1
The court noted that advancements in medical treatments and technolo-

67. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 793.

68. Id. The court took issue with the panel's phrasing of the issue as the "constitutional right to aid in killing oneself," stating that the "subject we must initially examine is not
nearly so limited." Id. at 801. The court also took issue with the use of the terms "'suicide'
and 'assisted suicide'" as "appropriate legal descriptions of the specific conduct at issue
.... " Id. at 802. Rather, it considered the terms "'right to die,' 'controlling the time and
manner of one's death,' and 'hastening one's death'" more accurate. Id. Because the court

resolved the issue under a due process analysis, it did not reach plaintiff's equal protection
arguments. Id. at 798.
69. Id.at 801.
70. Id. at 799.
71. Id. at 813-14 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).

72. Id. at 816.
73. Id. at 802-03. The court also noted that the panel decision erroneously concluded
that a historical analysis alone is sufficient basis for rejecting a claim to a substantive
liberty interest or right. Id. at 805. "Were history our sole guide, the Virginia anti-

miscegenation statute that the Court unanimously overturned in Loving v. Virginia ...
would still be in force because such ... laws were commonplace both when the United
States was founded and when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted." Id. at 806.
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gies often result in "protracted and painful deaths"74 for patients
suffering from AIDS and cancer, driving "a growing movement to restore
humanity and dignity to the process by which Americans die"75 and a
shift in "popular support for permitting doctors to provide assistance to
terminally ill patients who wish to hasten their deaths."7" However,
mere recognition of the interest did not decide the issue.77 Citing to
Cruzan, the only right-to-die case the Supreme Court has considered, the
court stated that it "must apply a balancing test under which we weigh
the individual's liberty interests against the relevant state interests in
order to determine whether" the Washington statute is an appropriate
regulation governing the exercise of the right, 78 recognizing "that some
prohibitory and regulatory state action is fully consistent with constitutional principles." 79 Those interests include (1) the state's unqualified
interest in preserving life, (2) preventing suicide, (3) avoiding the
involvement of third parties and preventing the use of undue influence,
(4) the effects on children, loved ones, and other family members, (5)
protecting the integrity of the medical profession, and (6) the "interest
in avoiding adverse consequences that might ensue if the statutory
provision at issue is declared unconstitutional."' However, under the
balancing test from Cruzan, the court found these interests substantially
reduced in comparison to the medical condition and wishes of the person
whose life hangs in the balance," especially since Washington has
already decided that its interests "should ordinarily give way" to
"competent, terminally ill adults" who wish to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment under its Natural Death Act." In fact, the court considered

74. Id. at 812.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 810.
77. Id. at 799.

78. Id
79. Id. at 816.
80. See 79 F.3d at 816-30.

81. 79 F.3d at 817. Regarding the need to prevent suicides, the state's primary
justification, the court stated there is no risk of a life ending prematurely because "[i]n the

case of a terminally ill adult who ends his life in the final stages of an incurable and
painful degenerative disease, in order to avoid debilitating pain and a humiliating death,

the decision to commit suicide is not senseless, and death does not come too early." Id. at
820-21. Also, procedural safeguards can be developed by the state and medical profession
"to ensure that the possibility of error will ordinarily be remote," and that the poor,
minorities and the elderly will remain free from undue influence in making their decisions.
Id. at 824-26.
82. Id. at 817. The Natural Death Act states in relevant part: "The legislature finds
that adult persons have the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to the
rendering of their own medical care, including the decision to have life-sustaining
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the state's insistence on frustrating their wishes "cruel indeed." 3
Finally, the court regarded the state's attempt to label the act of
terminating life support as an "omission" and prescribing drugs to
hasten death a "commission," a "distinction without a difference," stating
that in either case, "a doctor is unquestionably committing an act" by
"taking an active role in bringing about the patient's death." 4 Therefore, because "the liberty interest in hastening death is at its strongest
when the state's interest in protecting life and preventing suicide is at
its weakest," the court held that the "or aids" provision of Washington's
assisted suicide statute "is unconstitutional as applied to terminally ill
competent adults who wish to hasten [death] with medication prescribed
by their physicians." 5
Compassion in Dying v. Washington has broad implications for states
in the Ninth Circuit that make assisted suicide a crime, including
California.M Quill v. Vacco, 7 the Second Circuit reversal of Quill v.
Koppell decided less than a month after the Compassion in Dying en
banc decision, may have similar implications for New York and other
states in the Second Circuit. Both may be destined for review by the
Supreme Court. The Court generally does not intervene unless there are
conflicting decisions in the lower courts, and that is now the case. The
Court denied certiorari on People v. Kevorkian,' but both the Ninth
and Second Circuits have now declared such statutes unconstitutional,
albeit for different reasons. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit
panel in Quill declined to recognize a fundamental due process liberty
right to physician-assisted suicide without "clear direction from the
Court." 9 Nonetheless, it did find the statute unconstitutional under
Equal Protection," an argument the Ninth Circuit declined to address.9 Because it did not recognize a fundamental right, the court
applied the same rational basis scrutiny used for social welfare
legislation.9 2 Finally, it concluded that because New York had no
legitimate or rational reason for allowing terminally ill patients to
procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of terminal condition." Id. (quoting the
Natural Death Act). SEE SUPRA note 11 and accompanying text.

83. 79 F.3d at 817.
84. Id. at 822.
85. Id. at 836-37. The court also explicitly overruled Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429
(D. Or. 1995), as conflicting squarely with the reasoning of its opinion. Id. at 838.
86. See Mintz, supra note 53 and accompanying text.
87. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
88. Kevorkian v. Michigan, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
89. 80 F.3d at 725.
90. Id. at 727.
91. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 798.
92. 80 F.3d at 725.

COMPASSION IN DYING

1996]

1161

hasten death by discontinuing life support but not permitting them to
do so with physician prescribed drugs, the statutes at issue were
unconstitutional.93 However, like the Ninth Circuit, it refused to
distinguish between assisted suicide and withholding or withdrawing
treatment, stating that "the cause of death in both cases is the suicide's
On June 10,
conscious decision to 'pu[t] an end to his own existence."''
1996, the Supreme Court extended Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's May
order blocking the effect of the Compassion in Dying decision until the
Court decides whether to grant certiorari on it and the Second Circuit
Quill decision. 95 That decision is expected this fall." Whether certiorari is eventually granted may depend on the answers to the following
questions: (1) Will the Supreme Court be willing to reach into what
some would consider its Pandora's Box of substantive due process to
establish a right to physician assisted suicide, or will Roe v. Wade scare
the Court into deference to sectarianism? (2) Will the Court be able to
recognize that the distinction between the refusal of life-sustaining
treatment and physician-assisted suicide may be a "distinction without
a difference"? 97 (3) Can the Court recognize that there comes a time
when the state's interest in preservation of life must accede to the
individual's particularized interest in self-determination and the
avoidance of needless and prolonged suffering? As the Supreme Court
opined in Casey, "Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."98
It may soon have the opportunity to resolve the doubt enshrouding
physician-assisted suicide.
STEPHEN J. TYDE, JR.

93. Id. at 727.
94. Id. at 729 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 296-297 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations
omitted and alteration in original)).
95. Washington v. Glucksberg, 116 S. Ct. 2494 (1996). Justice O'Connor handles
emergency appeals from rulings by the Ninth Circuit. Rose Ragsdale, Supreme Court
blocks assisted suicide ruling, ALASKA JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, June 10, 1996, v20 n24.

96. News Briefs, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, June 11, 1996, 1996 WL 5936387.
97.

Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959); Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 822.

98. 112 S. Ct. at 2803.

